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Abstract 
We focus on disentailing the effect of labour market institutions and regulations on technical 
and allocative efficiency of banks. We opt for the Fraser index for labour regulation and its 
disaggregated sub-components, whilst follow a novel methodology to measure performance, 
based on the seminal work of Kumbhakar and Tsionas (2005), which allows the estimation of 
technical and allocative efficiency and the examination of the effect of labour market 
regulations in a single stage. Results indicate the existence of a positive relationship between 
the liberalization of EU labour markets and allocative efficiency, while the effect on technical 
efficiency appears to be negative, although not statistically significant. When looking at the 
disaggregated components of the labour index, we further confirm that different forces are at 
play. In particular, we find a negative relationship between allocative efficiency and the 
liberalization of price-related regulations, such as minimum wage and cost of dismissals 
regulations, while the relationship between technical efficiency and labour regulations that 
affect banks’ ability to adjust their labour input appears to be insignificant. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past decade, the European banking system has undergone significant structural 
changes, which have been further precipitated by the financial crisis. As part of this 
restructuring process, banks have focused their efforts on improving operating performance 
through a reduction in operating costs and have implemented wide-ranging cost-cutting 
measures by introducing organizational changes, and reducing both branch networks and the 
number of employees (ECB, 2003; 2013). Moreover, as a result of the financial and the 
sovereign debt crisis, the urgency to reduce costs and improve bank efficiency has further 
increased in the current challenging macroeconomic environment with slow credit growth, 
high funding costs and increasing non-performing loans. In addition, the crisis has clearly 
highlighted that the cycle of easy credit of the previous years masked serious underlying 
problems, such as the build-up of highly complex operating models and high cost structures, 
including personnel expenses.  
Although personnel expenses comprise a relatively small fraction of banks’ cost structure 
compared to other industries, they have been at the centre of bank managers’ cost-cutting 
efforts during the recent years. Data for the EU-15 banking systems from the OECD Bank 
Profitability Report (2010)1 suggest that personnel expenses as a share of total cost range 
from 5 per cent in Luxembourg to about 24 per cent in Greece. Moreover, staff expenses as a 
per cent of total bank costs were increasing up to 2004 in most countries, reaching about 35% 
in Greece, and above 25% in Spain, Italy, France and Denmark; however this trend was 
reversed since 2005. Overall, the data suggest that the rationalization of personnel expenses 
has been at the centre of managers’ cost-reducing efforts in recent years.  
 
Aknowledge: We would like to thank Anastasia Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki for excellent assistanship in preparing 
this manuscript. 
1 See Figure C1 in the Appendix. 
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Banks’ ability to adjust staff costs and their responsiveness to changing circumstances are 
highly influenced, among others, by labour institutions and regulations. According to Boeri et 
al. (2008) labour market regulations can affect firms’ choices over inputs, investments, 
technology and output. At an aggregate level labour regulation also influences the allocation 
of resources across firms and sectors of the economy, impacting on growth.2 Bertola, (2009) 
emphasises the important role of limited wage-setting flexibility, as well as of regulatory 
constraints on hiring and firing, and of employment protection legislation on labour mobility 
and thus, on the allocation of a key production input (labour). While a number of studies have 
examined the impact of labour regulations at a macro level (e.g., Botero et al.,2004; Lazear, 
1990), very few microeconomic cross-country empirical studies analyse the impact of labour 
market rigidities on firm-level outcomes (Lafontaine and Sivadasan, 2007). 
The aim of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature and to investigate the effects of labour 
market regulation on technical and allocative efficiency in the European banking industry 
over the period 2005-2010. In particular, we propose a new methodology, which builds on 
Kumbhakar and Tsionas (2005a) and Tsionas and Kumbhakar (2006) that allows us to 
estimate both technical and allocative efficiencies and to examine the effect of labour 
regulations in a single stage. We opt for maximum likelihood estimation of technical and 
allocative efficiency, while allowing errors in the share equations also to be present in the 
cost function equation.  
Our study is related to various strands of the literature. Foremost, this paper relates to the 
literature on bank efficiency (for a review, see Berger, 2007). A common finding of this 
literature is the high level of cross-country heterogeneity in the European banking system 
 
2 The effect of labour market regulations on economic outcomes is the subject of an ongoing debate among 
economists and policymakers (Boeri et al., 2008). Some argue that regulations affect negatively economic 
efficiency and therefore are detrimental for growth, while others argue that they are essential tools to correct 
market imperfections and achieve goals of redistribution without hampering efficiency (see Boeri and van Ours, 
2008 for a discussion). 
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(e.g. Altunbas et al., 2001; Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002; Maudos et al., 2002; Casu and 
Molyneux, 2003) and the importance of environmental (country-level) variables in explaining 
cross-country differences in bank efficiency (e.g. Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000). Among 
these factors, several studies have focused on the effect of regulation on bank efficiency and 
have found that banking regulations in particular can have a significant impact on the 
performance of financial institutions (e.g., Barth et al., 2004; 2009; Pasiouras et al., 2009, 
Mamatzakis et al. 2013). However, the regulatory framework in other areas of the economy, 
such as labour legislation, and its effect on bank performance has so far been neglected with 
the exception of E. Mamatzakis et al. (2013) that focuses on business regulation. This point is 
particularly emphasized by Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004), who investigated the impact of a 
wider set of regulations on bank net interest margins and overhead costs and found that 
tighter regulations on bank entry and bank activities raise the cost of financial intermediation, 
but also that bank regulations become insignificant when controlling for national indicators of 
economic freedom or property rights protection. They conclude that bank regulations cannot 
be viewed in isolation, as they reflect broad, national approaches to private property and 
competition. Studies that explicitly focus on the importance of country-level institutional or 
regulatory quality as determinants of bank efficiency are scarce and include, for example, 
Lensink et al. (2008), who found that the effect of foreign ownership on bank efficiency 
depends on the regulatory and institutional framework and Hasan et al. (2009), who 
examined the impact of institutional quality on the cost and profit efficiency of the banking 
sector at the regional level in China.  
Our study is also related to the literature on labour market regulations. Labour market 
regulation is the subject of much theoretical work as well as extensive empirical research 
(Bertola, 2009). In particular, labour market regulations that constrain firms’ ability to adjust 
employment levels are an important and controversial public policy issue in many countries 
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around the world. The relevant literature has mainly focused on the macroeconomic effects of 
labour market regulation and its impact on output and unemployment (Lazear, 1990; 
Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; Botero et al., 2004; Nickell, 1997; Nickell and Layard, 1999; 
Heckman and Pages, 2003). More specifically, labour regulations are often cited as a 
determinant of economic performance in OECD countries (e.g. Freeman, 1988; Nickell and 
Layard, 1999). It appears that the literature (Freeman, 1988; Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000; 
Nickell, 1997; Nickell and Layard, 1999; Besley and Burgess, 2004) predominantly suggests 
that a higher degree of labour market regulation leads to efficiency losses for firms. This is 
manifested in rising employment costs as a result of stricter employment protection 
legislation (Bassanini and Ernst 2002; Scarpetta and Tressel 2004, Mamatzakis et al. 2013), 
which in turn, negatively affects firms’ returns with respect to innovation and technology, 
resulting in declining productivity growth (Malcomson 1997). By contrast, labour market 
regulations, to the extent that they cause increased wage pressures, could result in higher 
labour productivity due to capital deepening and investment in capital-intensive industries 
(Autor et al., 2007).  
In this study we try to extend this literature by investigating the microeconomic implications 
of labour regulation and in particular by examining the effect of labour market regulation on 
EU bank performance. In more detail, we use a subcomponent of the Fraser Index on 
Economic Freedom to proxy labour market liberalization and investigate its effect on banks’ 
technical and allocative efficiency. Subsequently, we analyse the impact of the various sub-
components of the labour regulation index on allocative and technical efficiency, 
respectively. This latter stage of analysis is particularly interesting, as price-related labour 
market regulations are expected to impact on allocative efficiency, while regulations affecting 
the allocation of the labour input are expected to affect technical efficiency. A first glimpse at 
the results shows a positive relationship between the liberalization of EU labour markets and 
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allocative efficiency, while on the other hand, the relationship between technical efficiency 
and the labour market liberalization appears to be negative, although not significant. 
Furthermore, when disaggregating the labour market regulation index into its components, 
we find evidence of different forces at play. In particular, the analysis of the sub-components 
of the labour market regulation index provides evidence that price-related labour market 
regulations significantly affect bank performance through the channel of allocative 
efficiency. On the other hand, there appears to be no strong evidence of a significant 
relationship with technical efficiency. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the methodology, while 
Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Finally, section 5 
offers some concluding remarks and possible policy implications. 
 
2. Decomposing efficiency into technical and allocative: a theoretical framework  
In this section, we lay out the model proposed in Kumbhakar (1997) and Tsionas & 
Kumbhakar (2006). Let the production technology be specified as ( )iui iq f x e
−=  where qi is 
output and xi is a vector of J inputs for firm i (i = 1, …, n), f (.) is the production function, and 
0iu   measures input-oriented (IO) technical inefficiency (Farrell, 1957). This specification 
implies that a technically inefficient bank over-uses all the inputs by u 100 percent compared 
to an efficient bank producing the same output. Consequently, the IO measure of technical 
inefficiency is useful, when the objective of the banks is to allocate inputs in such a way that 
cost is minimized for an exogenously given level of output. In allocating inputs banks may 
make mistakes. These mistakes are labelled as allocative inefficiency. Here we follow 
Schmidt and Lovell (1979) and Kumbhakar (1997) in modelling allocative inefficiency, viz., 
,
1 , 1,( ) / ( ) / , 2,...,
j ii iu u
j i i j i if x e f x e w e w j J
− − = = , where fj (.) is the marginal product and wj is the price 
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of input j. Here a non-zero value of 
,j i  indicates the presence of allocative inefficiency for 
the input pair (j,1) for firm i. Note that unless the production function is homogeneous the IO 
technical inefficiency term (u) will not drop out from the first-order conditions.  
Since 
,j i  represents allocative inefficiency for the input pair (j, 1) the relevant input prices to 
the firm i (i = 1, …, n) are *
iw  ( 1,iw , 2, 2,exp( )i iw  ,…, , ,exp( ))J i J iw   ,
 where 
2, ,,...,i J i   are random 
variables that capture allocative inefficiency. Kumbhakar (1997) showed that actual cost 
could be expressed as 
* *ln ln ( , ) ln ( , , )ai i i i i i iC C w q G w q u= + +        (1) 
where , ,
a
ji j i j iC w x=  and
* *( , )i iC w q  is the minimum cost function obtained from solving the 
following problem: *'min subject to
u
i
u -u
i i i i
x e
w x e q f(x e )
−
− = . The G( , ,i i iw q  ) function in (1) is 
defined as ,*,(.)
j i
j j iG S e
−
= 
,
where * * *, ,ln (.) / lnj i j iS C w=   . Since (1) is strongly separable in iu , 
cost of technical inefficiency (percentage increase in cost due to technical inefficiency) is 
represented by 0iu  . The allocative inefficiency terms ( j ) appear both in the 
*(.)C  and the 
G(.) functions. Thus, to separate the cost of allocative inefficiency, we need to define 
0 ( , )i iC w q , the cost frontier (also labeled as the neoclassical cost function). For this, we rewrite 
the cost function in (1) as 0ln ln ( , ) ln ( , , )a ALi i i i i i iC C w q C w q u= + + where 
0 ( , )i iC w q  is the cost 
frontier (the neo-classical cost function), which can be obtained from the cost function in (1) 
by imposing restrictions that firms are efficient both technically and allocatively. That is, 
0
,ln (.) ln (. | 0 , 0)
a
j i iC C j u= =  =
*
, 0 , 0ln (.) | (since ln (.) | 0)j i j iC G = == = and ln ( , , )
AL
i i iC w q   
0 * *
0ln | ln (.) ln ( , ) ln ( , , )i
a
u i i i i iC C C w q G w q == − = +
0ln (.)C− . The ln ALiC term can be interpreted as 
the percentage increase in cost due to allocative inefficiency. 
If we assume a parametric functional form (e.g., translog) for *(.)C , i.e., 
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( )
2* * * * * *1 1
0 , , , ,2 2
ln ( , ) ln ln ln ln ln ln lni i j j i q i qq i jk j i k i jq j i i
j j k j
C w q w q q w w w q     = + + + + +    
the cost function and the associated cost share equations in terms of C0(.) are (see Kumbhakar 
and Tsionas (2005), p. 738) 
ln(C
i
a /w
1,i
) = lnC
i
0(w
i
,q
i
)+ lnC
i
AL(w
i
,q
i
,x
i
)+u
i
,      (2) 
S
j ,i
a = S
j ,i
0 (w
i
,q
i
)+h
j,i
(w
i
,q
i
,x
i
) , 1,...,i n= ; j = 2, …, J     (3) 
where w
i
= (w
2,i
/w
1,i
,...,w
J ,i
/w
1,i
), , , , /
a a
j i j i j i iS w x C=  is the actual (observed) cost share of input j  (
2,...,j J= ), C
i
0(w
i
,q
i
)  is the normalized (by 1,iw ) cost frontier and 
0 0
, ,ln (.) / lnj i i j iS C w=    (
2,...,j J= ).  For the above translog cost function lnC
i
0(w
i
,q
i
)  is 
lnC
i
0(.) =a
0
+ a
j
lnw
j ,i
+g
q
lnq
i
+ 1
2
g
qq
lnq
i( )
2
+ 1
2
b
jk
lnw
j ,i
lnw
k ,i
+ g
jq
lnw
j ,i
lnq
i
j=2
J
å ,
k=2
J
å
j=2
J
å
j=2
J
å  (4) 
 S
j ,i
0 =a
j
+ b
jk
lnw
k ,i
+g
jq
lnq
i
k=2
J
å , j = 2,...,J ,         (5) 
lnC
i
AL = lnG
i
+ a
j
x
j ,i
+ b
jk
x
j ,i
lnw
k ,i
+
k=2
J
å
j=2
J
å
j=2
J
å 1
2
b
jk
x
j ,i
x
k ,i
+
k=2
J
å
j=2
J
å g
jq
x
j ,i
lnq
i
j=2
J
å ,     (6) 
 0, , ,
,
,
1 exp( )
exp( )
j i i j i j i
j i
i j i
S G a
G



− +
= ,  2,...,j J=       (7) 
where 
0
, , ,
2
( )exp( )
J
i j i j i j i
j
G S a 
=
= + − ,        (8) 
and  
, ,
2
J
j i jk k i
k
a  
=
=  .           (9)  
The cost system defined in (2) and (3) serves two purposes. First, technical and allocative 
inefficiencies are modeled in a coherent manner. Second, the exact link between allocative 
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inefficiency (
j ) and its cost is given in (6). The cost function decomposes the overall 
increase in cost due to inefficiency into two components, viz., the percentage increase in cost 
due to allocative inefficiency, ln ALiC , and the percentage increase in cost due to technical 
inefficiency, ui.  The decomposition formula also establishes an exact link between the error 
terms in the cost share equations (which are functions of allocative inefficiency) and cost of 
allocative inefficiency, which is very important from estimation point of view.  
In general, the link is provided by the relationship ln ( , , )AL i i iC w q   = 
* *ln ( , ) ln ( , , )i i i i iC w q G w q +
0ln (.)C− . For the Cobb-Douglas case, this link is established in Schmidt and Lovell (1979), 
viz., 1
2 2 1
ln ln ln[ ]j
J J J
AL
j j j j
j j j
C e

    
−
= = =
 
= + + − 
 
   . Since Schmidt and Lovell used the system 
consisting of the production function and the first-order conditions of cost minimization, it 
was not necessary to use the above link in estimation. It was, however, used to compute the 
cost of allocative inefficiency.   
The crux of the problem is in estimating the cost system in (2) and (3) using the link between 
cost of allocative inefficiency and errors in the cost share equations (which are functions of 
allocative inefficiency), given in equations (6), (8) and (9). It can be seen that the error 
structure based on u and j in (2) and (3) is quite complicated. Because of this the model has 
not been estimated using cross-sectional data.3 In the following section, we discuss an 
estimation method, first with only allocative inefficiency and then with both technical and 
allocative inefficiency. 
 
 
3 The system described in (2) and (3) is somewhat similar to the panel data model of Kumbhakar and Tsionas 
(2005a) model which assumed the presence of additional error terms in the share equations. Integrability 
condition requires that if there are errors in the share equations, these errors should also appear in the cost 
function (McElroy (1987)). No such allowance was made in the Kumbhakar and Tsionas (2005a) model.  
Furthermore, they used a Bayesian approach to estimate the system. Here we propose a classical ML method 
without any extra error terms in the share equations. 
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2.1 Maximum likelihood estimation 
With both technical and allocative inefficiency the system is 
ln ( , )
( , )
AL
ii i i
i i i
ii
C v u
y X X
 
 
  
   + +
= +  +   
  
    (10) 
where 2~ . . . (0, )i uu i i d N   ( 0)iu   is distributed independently of iv  and i . The convolution 
i i iv u  +  has a familiar distribution, namely,
2
( ) i iif
 
 
  
   
=    
   
, where 2 2 2
v u  = + , 
/u v  = , and ,     denote, respectively the pdf and cdf of the standard normal variable (see 
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), p. 140). Consequently, ( | ) ( ln ( , ))ALi i i ip p C    = − .  
Assuming 
1~ . . . (0, )i Ji i d N −   as before, we obtain the following joint probability density 
function  
( , ) ( | ) ( ) ( | ( , )) ( ( , )). | det ( , ) |i i i i i i i i i i i ip p p p p D               =  =   
             2 ( [ ln ( , ]) | det ( , ) |ALi i i iC D

 
     =  −    
2
/ 2 1/ 2 11
22
[ ln ( , )]
(2 ) det( ) exp ( , ) ( , )
2
AL
J i i
i i
C
e e
  
    

− − −
 − 
 − −  
  
. 
Using  
0
0
, , ,
ln ln ( ) ln ( , ( , ))
( ),   1,..., 1,
a AL
i i i i i i
a
j i j i j i
C C C
S S j J
     
 
= − −
= − = −
 
the likelihood function becomes:  
1 1
( , , , ; , )
( [ ln ( , ]) | det ( , ) |
v u
n n
n AL
i i i i
i i
L y X
C D

  
      −
= =
 
 − −   
 
 2/ 2 2 11 122
1 1
det( ) exp [ ln ( , )] ( , ) ( , )
n n
n AL
i i i i i i
i i
C e e

      − −
= =
 − − −   ,   (11) 
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where ( , ) ( , ) ( , )i i i i ie        = − , and 
1
1
( , ) ( , )
n
i i i
i
n     −
=
=  . The above likelihood function 
can be concentrated with respect to  , the ML estimator of which is:  
1
1
ˆ ( ) ( , ) ( , )
n
i i i i
i
n e e    −
=
 =  . 
Thus, the concentrated log-likelihood function is proportional to: 
2
2
1 1
ln ( , , ; , ) ln( ) ln ( [ ln ( , ]) ln | det ( , ) |
n n
C ALn
v u i i i i
i i
L y X C D

         
= =
= − +  − − +   
2
21
2 2
1
ˆˆdet( ( )) [ ln ( , )]
n
ALn
i i
i
C

   
=
−  − − .     (12) 
Here,   and   are functions of the original parameters v  and u . The model can be 
generalized so that μ is the mean vector of allocative distortion parameters. This means vector 
can be made function of a vector of exogenous variables, say 
iz , so we have: 
i iz =  . 
In this way the exogenous variables have an impact on allocative efficiency, which can be 
measured easily (e.g. using elasticities) after the parameters have been estimated by the 
method of ML.  
To maximize the log-likelihood functions shown in (12) we use the Nelder-Mead simplex 
maximization technique that does not require numerical derivatives. To compute standard 
errors for the parameters we have used the BHHH formula, which is based on first-order 
derivatives of the log-density with respect to the parameters.  
 
3. Dataset 
Bank-level data for the estimation of efficiency are obtained from the Fitch IBCA-Bankscope 
database and includes commercial, savings and cooperative banks in EU-15 countries 
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(Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK) over the period 2005-2010. After 
removing errors and related inconsistencies, we end up with a balanced sample of 2,410 
banks. For the definition of inputs and outputs we follow Sealey and Lindley (1977) and 
employ the intermediation approach. The output vector includes loans and other earning 
assets (government securities, bonds, equity investments, CDs, T-bills, equity investment 
etc.), while total cost is defined as the sum of overheads (personnel and administrative 
expenses), interest, fees, and commission expenses. Regarding input prices, the price of 
labour is proxied by the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets, while the price of deposits 
is measured by the ratio of total interest expenses to total borrowed funds and the price of 
physical capital is calculated as the ratio of other operating expenses to fixed assets. Equity is 
specified as a fixed netput and is included to account for both the risk-based capital 
requirements and the risk-return trade-off that bank face (Färe et al., 2004). 
 
3.1 Measuring labour market regulation  
In order to capture labour market regulations, we employ the Fraser Index of Economic 
Freedom (Gwartney et. al, 2011) and particularly, one of the five components of the index, 
namely, labour market liberalization.4 This indicator quantifies the degree of stringency and 
distortions associated with existing labour regulations and institutions and provides a 
synthetic measure of the anti-competitive implications of existing regulations and institutions 
(European Commission, 2012). The index ranges from 0 to 10, with 0 indicating the lowest 
and 10 the highest degree of liberalization in the labour market, respectively.  
 
4 The Fraser Index of Economic Freedom consists of five factors: size of government; legal structure and 
security of property rights; access to sound money; freedom to exchange with foreigners; and regulation of 
credit, labour, and business. These are weighted components that form a composite index ranging from 0 to 10, 
with 0 indicating the lowest and 10 the highest level of economic freedom. The use of this index is common in 
the economic literature (see for example Carlsson and Lundstrom, 2002). 
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Over the period 2000-2010 for all EU-15 countries, there is a significant liberalization in 
European labour markets in all EU countries except Luxembourg. This is not surprising, as 
the need to improve the functioning of EU labour markets has featured prominently in the 
priorities of the EU strategy, especially over the last decade. According to the European 
Commission (2012): ‘Since the onset of EMU, there was clear awareness that a successful 
monetary union would have required reforming labour markets where needed in such a way 
to ease adjustment in the face of asymmetric shocks and to permit a prompt reaction of price 
competitiveness as a tool to absorb idiosyncratic shocks and favour the correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances.’ The need for timely and comprehensive labour market reforms 
has become even more pertinent in light of the recent sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, 
especially for countries under IMF/EC/ECB programs. However, there appears to be no clear 
relationship between the initial conditions of labour market performance and subsequent 
reform efforts, which is also consistent with the findings of the OECD (Brandt et al., 2005). 
In addition, according to the European Commission (2012) the distribution of reforms across 
countries reveals that there is a relatively low degree of cross-country synchronization of 
reforms over the examined period. 
 
In our analysis, we also employ the sub-components of the Fraser Index on labour regulation 
over the period 2000-2010. In particular, the index is decomposed into the following factors: 
i) hiring regulations and minimum wage, ii) hiring and firing regulations, iii) centralized 
collective bargaining, iv) regulation of hours of work, v) mandated cost of worker dismissal 
and vi) conscription.5 Note that the sub-components of the labour regulation index also take 
 
5 The data used to construct the Fraser Index and its sub-components are from external sources such as the IMF, 
World Bank, and World Economic Forum that provide data for a large number of countries. These raw data are 
transformed into component ratings and which are then used to construct the scores. Complete methodological 
details can be found in the “Economic Freedom of the World: Annual Report 2012”. We exclude the 6th sub-
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values from 0 to 10, with higher values suggesting greater economic freedom and low values 
indicating the existence of market rigidities. 
In more detail, the first subcomponent of Frazer labour market regulation index, “hiring 
regulations and minimum wage”, focuses on the difficulty of hiring and captures some 
fundamental labour market issues, such as: whether fixed-term contracts allow for permanent 
tasks, the maximum cumulative duration of fixed-term contracts; and the ratio of the 
minimum wage for a trainee or first-time employee to the average value added per worker. 
Looking at Figure 2 (up left panel) we observe significant differences across countries, both 
with regards to the trend of reforms, as well as their direction and their intensity.   
The second subcomponent of the Fraser Labour Index is “hiring and firing regulations” and 
captures whether labour market regulations hinder the hiring and firing of workers. Figure 2 
(up right panel), shows a somewhat slow trend towards greater liberalization in hiring and 
firing regulations in most countries, suggesting that there may be room for additional 
liberalization in this area. 
The third subcomponent of the Fraser Labour Index is “centralized collective bargaining”, 
which refers to country-level industrial relations, and captures whether wages are set by a 
centralized bargaining process or are left up to each individual company. As we can observe 
from Figure 2 (middle left panel), there are diverging trends across countries, with about half 
of EU Member States exhibiting a trend towards higher centralization over time. 
The fourth subcomponent of the Fraser labour Index, “hours regulations” captures various 
elements including: restrictions on night work; restrictions on weekly holiday work; 5.5 work 
week; 50 hours or more, including overtime, work week so as to respond to a seasonal 
increase in production; and 21 working days or fewer paid annual vacation. For most 
 
component of the Fraser Index on labour regulation from our analysis, as we consider it less relevant for the 
banking system.  
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countries, but Spain and Greece, we observe a trend towards liberalization over the period 
2000-2010. 
The “mandated cost of worker dismissal” comprises the fifth subcomponent of the Fraser 
Labour Index and captures the cost of the advance notice requirements, severance payments, 
and penalties due when dismissing a redundant worker.  
 
3.2 Control Variables 
A number of control variables are also included in our analysis in order to account for 
individual bank characteristics that could affect cost efficiency, such as bank size, credit risk 
and banks’ net interest margin. In particular, the following variables are included: 
Bank Size: Although banks in the EU-15 banking systems have similar organizational 
structure and objectives, they vary significantly in size. Therefore, we include the logarithm 
of total assets to account for differences in the size of each bank. Bank size is also a proxy for 
economies or diseconomies of scale and can lead to either higher or lower costs for banks. If 
large banks exercise market power, they may increase the costs for the sector through slack 
and inefficiency. In a similar vein, small banks operating mostly in local markets may have 
access to “soft” information about local conditions, engage in “relationship lending” and 
become more efficient than large banks (Berger, 2007). By contrast, if the size of a bank 
reflects economies of scale and consolidation through the survival of more efficient banks, 
larger banks may be more cost efficient. Empirical evidence on the relationship between bank 
size and efficiency is inconclusive (see Altunbas et al., 2001; Carbo et al., 2002; Maudos and 
De Guevara, 2007). 
Credit risk: Managing credit risk is an important part of bank operations. Changes in credit 
risk may reflect changes in the quality of a bank’s loan portfolio and may affect bank 
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performance. As a proxy for credit risk we use the ratio of loan loss provisions to gross loans. 
The relationship between inefficiency and credit risk could be positive according to the ‘bad 
management’ or the ‘bad luck’ hypotheses developed by Berger and DeYoung (1997), or 
negative under the ‘skimping’ hypothesis.6 
Net interest margin: Despite the rising importance of fee-based income as a proportion of 
total income, net interest margins remain one of the principal elements of bank net cash flows 
and profits. We employ the net interest margin as a traditional measure of bank performance, 
which captures banks’ primary intermediation function, while it also serves as a proxy for 
bank competition. .  
Finally, following the literature, our analysis includes some macroeconomic country-specific 
variables, namely GDP growth and the inflation rate as proxies for fluctuations in economic 
activity.  
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Technical and allocative efficiency scores 
Table 1 presents the average technical and allocative efficiency scores by country over the 
period 2005-2010.7 Our results are in line with the vast majority of the literature that 
estimates the average cost efficiency of EU countries in the range of 0.80 to 0.85  (see for 
 
6 Under the ‘bad luck’ hypothesis of Berger and DeYoung (1997), exogenous events may cause an increase in a 
bank’s problem loans and the additional managerial effort required to deal with these non-performing loans, will 
increase bank costs. The ‘bad management’ hypothesis assumes that an inefficient bank manager will apply 
poor senior management practices to both day-to-day operations (increased cost inefficiency) and to managing 
the loan portfolio (lower credit quality). Under the ‘skimping’ hypothesis, a bank may appear more cost efficient 
in the short run, if it allocates fewer resources to monitoring loans, as less operating expenses can support the 
same quantity of loans and other outputs. 
7 The average efficiency scores presented in Table 1 are derived from equation (12) using the aggregate labour 
index to capture labour market regulations and institutions (Table 2 results). Efficiency results derived from the 
rest of the models presented in this paper (using the sub-components of the aggregate labour index-see tables 3 
and 4) are broadly similar and we do not observe any marked sensitivity of the distributions of technical and 
allocative efficiency. Results are available from the authors upon request.   
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example Cavallo and Rossi, 2001; 2002; Casu and Girardone, 2004, 2006; Maudos and De 
Guevara, 2007). Specifically, the average technical efficiency level for all EU-15 countries is 
estimated at 0.84, ranging from 0.77 in Belgium to 0.92 in Finland. Average allocative 
efficiency is estimated at 0.89, ranging from 0.86 in Ireland to 0.91 in Finland. Over time (see 
Figure 1), average technical efficiency remains broadly stable up to 2007 and decreases 
significantly thereafter, following the advent of the global financial crisis. Technical 
efficiency improves slightly in 2009 and continues its upward trend also in 2010. Allocative 
efficiency exhibits a similar trend, showing a clear downward trend after 2007. This trend 
continues up to 2009, while allocative efficiency starts improving in 2010. Moreover, cross-
country analysis reveals similar patterns in the evolution of efficiency scores over time across 
countries. Looking at the distribution of technical and allocative efficiency over time, we 
observe (Figure 1) that during the financial crisis (for the years 2008 and 2009) the 
distribution of both technical and allocative efficiency flattens and moves to the left (to lower 
efficiency scores). Overall, our efficiency analysis shows that the financial crisis has 
significantly affected banks’ allocative and technical efficiency and that some improvement 
is observed in 2010, which could reflect banks’ increasing efforts to cut down their costs. 
(Insert Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 about here) 
Figure 2 presents the distribution of price distortions, across the entire sample, for the prices 
of borrowed funds (straight line) and labour (dotted line). These parameters are the ξ’s in 
system (2)-(3). The labour price distortion averages approximately 10% and can be as large 
as about 30-40%. The price distortion of borrowed funds ranges between -20% and 10%, its 
average is close to -5% and there is clearly some heterogeneity of its distribution across 
banks –evidenced by the distinct bimodality of the sample distribution. These results indicate 
that banks effectively face much higher labour costs compared to nominal prices, while most 
of them buy cheap their borrowed funds. However, there is considerable heterogeneity among 
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banks regarding their funding cost, as evidenced by the sizable probability to the right of zero 
in the distribution of borrowed fund distortions. The higher heterogeneity in the price of 
borrowed funds across banks could be explained by differences in banks’ business models 
and by the fact that banks’ funding structures differ significantly across countries and across 
banks of different size and with different institutional characteristics (ECB, 2009).  
(Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here) 
In Figure 4, we present the sample distributions of price distortions for borrowed funds 
(upper panel) and labour (bottom panel). We observe that the distributions clearly change 
over time. For example, after the sub-prime crisis borrowed funds become more expensive, 
while wage costs decrease from about 10% or 15% in previous periods to about 5% on the 
average in 2010. This is consistent with the effect of the global financial crisis on banks’ 
funding cost, which has increased significantly, putting an end to a period of ample liquidity 
observed prior to the crisis (ECB, 2009). Similarly, the ramifications of the financial crisis for 
executives’ compensations and for the financial sector’s employees’ salaries are possibly 
evident in the fall in labour costs. 
 
4.2 The impact of aggregate labour regulation index 
Table 2 presents the output from estimating Eq. (12) on the relationship between bank 
efficiency (both technical and allocative) and labour market regulation using the aggregate 
labour market regulation index.  
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
Our results indicate that the relationship between labour market liberalization and bank 
efficiency is complex. On the one hand, we observe a negative relationship between labour 
market regulation and technical efficiency, which is marginally statistically significant at the 
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10% level, while on the other hand, the effect of labour market liberalization on allocative 
efficiency appears to be positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Overall, the 
labour economics literature provides mixed evidence with regard to the impact of labour 
regulation on economic performance (Bassanini et al., 2009). Theoretically, there are several 
potential ways in which labour market regulation can affect firms’ efficiency. From the 
employers’ point of view, increasing employment protection could either improve economic 
performance by giving incentives to invest in labour-saving technology and innovate, or it 
could have the opposite effect (Bassanini et al., 2009). From the employees’ point of view, 
higher employment protection might induce workers to invest in firm-specific knowledge, 
improving their productivity. On the other hand, tenure may reduce employees’ motivation to 
build up specialized skills to increase their productivity.  
Our finding of a negative, albeit marginally statistically significant, relationship between 
technical efficiency and labour market liberalization could reflect one of the above incentives 
in that labour market liberalization does not offer incentives for the development of firm-
specific knowledge and skills, which are important to firm performance (see also Black and 
Lynch, 1996). Moreover, and specific to the banking sector, a higher degree of labour market 
liberalization that increases turnover and labour mobility, may negatively impact on 
‘relationship lending’ in banking, which is based on the personal interaction and relationship 
between customers and bank employees, thus negatively affecting technical efficiency. In 
addition, Autor et al., (2007) argue that labour market regulations that enhance wage 
pressures would induce higher labour productivity due to capital deepening and investment in 
capital-intensive technologies. This is also consistent with the findings of Storm and 
Naastepad (2009) showing that at a macro level a regulated and ‘rigid’ industrial relations 
system promotes labour productivity growth in twenty OECD countries. Moreover, Deakin 
and Sarkar (2008) also showed that labour regulation that strengthens dismissal laws has 
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positive effects on productivity growth in France and Germany, and in the United States over 
the long term (from the 1970s to mid-2000s). Furthermore, Auer (2007) argues that strict 
employment protection, and labour market regulation more generally, reduces excessive 
labour turnover, facilitates the reallocation of resources into activities having above-average 
productivity growth, and generates high-quality job matches.  
On the other hand, we find strong evidence that a higher degree of market liberalization has a 
positive effect on banks’ allocative efficiency. This result is consistent with Lafontaine and 
Sivadasan (2007), who find a significant impact of labour laws on labour adjustment and 
related decisions at the micro level. In particular, our finding indicates that in a more 
liberalized labour market, banks are able to respond more efficiently to changes in the price 
of labour and to adjust their labour input accordingly. This positive relationship between 
allocative efficiency and labour market liberalization is also consistent with the findings of 
Scarpetta and Tressel (2004), who found evidence that high labour adjustment costs (proxied 
by the strictness of employment protection legislation) can have a strong negative impact on 
productivity. More specifically, they argue that strict labour market regulations that raise the 
cost of adjusting factor inputs, including labour, are likely to reduce incentives for innovation 
and adoption of new technologies, and lead to lower productivity performance (Scarpetta and 
Tressel, 2004).  
Looking at the effect of bank-specific variables on technical and allocative efficiency, our 
results are consistent with the literature. More specifically, we observe that bank size has a 
positive effect on both technical and allocative efficiency, while banks with a higher capital 
ratio exhibit higher technical efficiency, but lower allocative efficiency. The ratio of loan loss 
provisions to loans, which captures credit risk and the quality of banks’ loan portfolio, 
exhibits a negative relationship with bank technical efficiency, which is consistent with the 
‘bad management hypothesis’ of Berger and DeYoung (1997), while it has a positive 
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coefficient in the case of allocative efficiency, consistent with the ‘skimping hypothesis’ (see 
Berger and DeYoung, 1997). The net interest margin appears to assert a negative effect on 
technical efficiency, while it affects positively allocative efficiency. Finally, regarding the 
macroeconomic variables, we find that the coefficient of GDP growth is only statistically 
significant in the case of allocative efficiency and takes a positive sign, while inflation 
appears to have a negative and statistically significant effect. 
4.3 The impact of sub-components of labour regulation 
As a next step and in order to get a more accurate assessment of the importance of labour 
market regulation, we decompose the aggregate labour regulation index into its different 
components, which are, in turn, grouped into two categories. The first category incorporates 
the indicators with a direct effect on the price of labour (i.e. the minimum wage, the cost of 
dismissals) that are expected to have an impact on banks’ allocative efficiency through their 
ability to respond to changes in input prices. The second category of indicators includes 
variables that affect the general institutional setting in the labour market and banks’ ability to 
adjust the input of labour (i.e. hiring and firing regulations, centralized collective bargaining 
and mandated hours worked) and are expected to have an impact on banks’ technical 
efficiency. Tables 3 and 4 present the estimated results for allocative and technical efficiency, 
respectively. 
(Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here) 
Table 3 shows that there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between 
allocative efficiency and the sub-components of the labour regulation index that affect the 
price of labour. This relationship is confirmed in all specifications (models 1-3). In particular, 
we find that the dismissal cost sub-index has a negative and statistically significant effect on 
allocative efficiency, in line with the findings of Bassanini and Ernst (2002) and Scarpetta 
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and Tressel (2004). According to Cappelli (2000) increased dismissal costs that raise the 
costs of workforce adjustment, may reduce incentives for firms to expand and innovate, thus 
affecting their cost performance. In particular, hiring and firing costs increase labour 
adjustment costs and create disincentives for firms to foster internal efficiency through the 
adoption of leading technologies and innovation (see e.g., Audretsch and Thurik, 2001). 
Moreover, the coefficient for the minimum wage sub-component also asserts a negative and 
statistically significant effect on allocative efficiency. Our results are consistent with Agell 
(1999), who argues that significant employment security together with a compressed wage 
structure stimulates investment in education by workers, with positive effects on their 
productivity by providing workers with insurance against wage risk. Lower wage risk could 
also have a positive effect on ‘relationship lending’ in banking, thus positively affecting bank 
efficiency through improved personal relationships between customers and bank employees. 
Our results are further confirmed when looking at models 2 and 3, where we examine the 
separate effect of each subcomponent of the labour regulation index. Both the coefficients of 
the minimum wage sub-component and the dismissal cost sub-index retain their sign and 
significance. Regarding the remaining bank-specific and macro variables, they all take the 
expected signs and confirm our previous findings. On the other hand, when looking at the 
results for technical efficiency (Table 4), we find that the relationship between technical 
efficiency and the sub-components of the labour regulation index that affect banks’ ability to 
adjust their labour input is not statistically significant in any of the specifications (models 1-
4).  
These results are of interest as they provide for the first time insights into the relationship 
between specific aspects of labour regulation and bank performance. In particular, the 
analysis of the sub-components of the labour market regulation index provides evidence that 
labour market regulations that affect the price of labour significantly affect bank performance 
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through the channel of allocative efficiency. On the other hand, there appears to be no strong 
evidence of a significant relationship with technical efficiency.  
5. Conclusion  
The labour economics literature provides mixed evidence regarding the impact of labour 
regulation on firm economic performance, whilst the bank performance literature has so far 
neglected to examine the importance of labour regulation. This paper tries to fill this gap in 
the literature and examines the impact of labour regulation on technical and allocative 
efficiency of the EU-15 banking system over the period 2005-2010. In particular, we employ 
the Fraser index for labour regulation and its sub-components and propose a novel 
methodology based on the seminal work of Kumbhakar and Tsionas (2005) to investigate the 
relationship between labour market liberalization and technical and allocative efficiency in 
European banking. 
Overall, our evidence shows that the relationship between bank efficiency and labour market 
regulation is complex. We find that labour market regulation affects bank efficiency mainly 
through the channel of allocative efficiency, while its effect on technical efficiency is not 
significant. More specifically, we find a positive effect of labour market liberalization on 
allocative efficiency, which is consistent with the findings of Autor et al., (2007) and 
Lafontaine and Sivadasan (2007). However, when looking at the various sub-components of 
the labour market regulation index, we find that diverging forces are at play. In particular,  
we observe that the liberalization of the minimum wage regulations and of the cost of 
dismissals has a negative effect on allocative efficiency. These findings are consistent with 
Bassanini and Ernst (2002) and Scarpetta and Tressel (2004), who argue that hiring and firing 
costs increase labour adjustment costs and create disincentives for firms to foster internal 
efficiency. Moreover, our results indicate that insurance against wage risk and job security in 
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general, as reflected by a lower level of labour market liberalization, can have a positive 
effect on ‘relationship lending’ in banking, with positive effects on bank efficiency through 
improved personal relationships between customers and bank employees. Regarding policy 
implications, our findings clearly demonstrate the complex relationship between efficiency 
and labour market regulations and the need for policy makers to take this into consideration 
in the design of labour market reforms.  
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Appendix A: Derivation of the likelihood function in the presence of only allocative 
inefficiency 
Since the error vector is ( , ) 'i i  , for the ML method one has to derive the joint pdf of ( , ) 'i i   
starting from the distributions on 
iv  and i .  For ML, we need to derive the joint pdf of 
( , ) 'i i  , that is |( , ) ( | ) ( )i i i i ip p p      =  where 
2| ~ (ln ( ( ), ), )ALi i i i vN C       and ( )i i   is the 
solution of 
i  in terms of i  from ( , )i i i   = . Furthermore, the pdf of ( )ip   can be expressed 
as 
( ) ( ( )). | det ( ) |i i i i ip p D     = ,       (A.1) 
where ( )i iD   is the Jacobian matrix (derivatives of i  with respect to i ). Therefore, the joint 
pdf of the error vector in (11) is 
/ 2 2 1/ 2 1/ 2
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 (A.2) 
where ( , ) ( , )i i i ie      = − , and μ is the mean vector of allocative distortion parameters.  
In practice, to implement the likelihood function based on (A.2) we have to show that (i)   
can be solved in terms of  , and (ii) the Jacobian matrix can be derived analytically. We 
show these next. 
For notational simplicity now we drop the observation index i . The first task is to solve for   
in terms of  . Note that:  
0a
j j jS S = −
0
1
[1 exp( )]
exp( )
J
j j jk k
k
j
S G
G
  

=
− + 
=  
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0 0
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J
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=
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1 2
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J J
a
j j j jk k j jk k
k k
S G S S    
= =
 = + = +  , 1,...,j J= .                (A.3) 
For the last equality we used the normalization
1 0 = . The equations in (A.3) can be expressed 
in ratio form to generate the following system of nonlinear equations,  
0
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, 2,...,j J= ,          (A.4) 
where 1/
a a
j jS S = . In Appendix B we use fixed point arguments to show that a solution of j  
exists and is unique. Once the 
j s are obtained, the value of G  can be obtained as 
0
*1 1
2 1
1 1
J
k k
k
a a
S
S
G
S S
 
=
+ 
= = . Note that we need G  to compute ln ( , )AL iC   .  
The second task is to derive the Jacobian of the transformation from   to  . To compute it 
we start again from the definition of 
j , i.e., 
0
2
(1 )
J
j j ik k
k
j
j
S h
h
 
 =
− + 
= , 2,...,j J= , where exp( )j jh G = . Differentiating it with respect 
to 
l  gives: 
ja k k
j jl j jk
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k l l
h
h S
 
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  
  
+ = 
  
,       
 (A.5) 
where jl  is the Kronecker delta. The system in (A.5) can be written as: 
D M = ,       (A.6) 
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where jajk j jk
k
h
S 


 = −

, kkj
j
D



=

, 
2( ,..., )JM diag h h= − . Here, D  (the short form of ( )j jD  ) is 
the Jacobian of the transformation. The solution of D from (A.6) is 1D M−= , and 
1
2
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J
j
j
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=
=   . To evaluate the components of   we obtain 
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, 2,...,k J= , 
with the understanding that all the previous expressions are evaluated at the solution of the 
system which is ( )  = . Thus, the solution for the ith observation can be written as 
( , )i i i   = , and the likelihood function is 
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 (A.7) 
where ( , ) ( , )i i i ie      = − . 
The ML estimators of 2
v ,   and   are: 
2 1 2
1
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v i i i
i
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1
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( ) [ ( ) ( )][ ( ) ( ))]
n
i i
i
n        −
=
 = − − ,    
where ( ) ( , )i i i     , and i  is the cost share residual vector. In fact, in this study we want to 
make allocative inefficiency function of a vector of exogenous variables, say 
iz , so we have: 
i iz =  , 
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and we do not use the estimator m(b) ; therefore, we have ( ) ( )i i     = . 
The concentrated log-likelihood function is: 
ln LC (b; y,X ) = const.- (n / 2)lns
v
2(b)- (n / 2)ln(det(W(b)))+ ln | detDx
i
(h
i
,b) |
i=1
n
å .  (A.8) 
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Appendix B: Existence and uniqueness of solution to the system of equations 
Theorem: If (B1) the actual share 0aiS   for all {1,..., }i J =Z , (B2) for every iZ , we have (
0ij   for some jZ ), where ij  represents the second-order translog coefficients with 
respect to prices, (B3) 0jk
j


=
Z
, and (B4) 0 1j
j
S

=
Z
, then  (i) there exists a solution of  in the 
system of equations in (14), and (ii) the solution is unique. 
Proof: Before proving the existence and uniqueness, we note that the condition in (B1) 
follows from the definition of cost shares, while that in (B2) is necessary for flexibility of the 
translog cost function. Finally, the conditions (B3) and (B4) follow from homogeneity (of 
degree one in input prices) of the cost function. 
(i) Existence. 
The system in (14) is of the form 0exp( )aj j j jk k
k
S G S  

= + 
Z
, jZ . Note that here we are 
considering the system in which the homogeneity restrictions are not directly imposed by 
expressing all prices and cost relative to one input price. Let exp( )aj j jS G = , jZ , so that 
ln ln lnaj j jS G = + + , jZ . Then the system in (14) can be written in the form 
0 0ln ln ln ln lna aj j jk k jk k jk j jk k jk k
k k k k k
S S G S S       
    
= − + − = − +    
Z Z Z Z Z
, jZ .     (B.1) 
 such that  1j
j


=
Z
. Then { | 1}n j
j
  +

   =
Z
S , the unit simplex in n . Write the residual 
from the cost share system (3) as: 
0( ) ln lnaj j j jk k jk k
k k
f S S    
 
= − + − 
Z Z
, jZ .                      (B.2) 
Define the mapping: 
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+ 
Z
, jZ . 
Clearly, :g →S S , i.e., it maps S  into itself and is continuous. By Brouwer's fixed point 
theorem, there exists a * S  such that * *( )g  = , which implies that: 
* 2 * * 2( ) ( )j j k
k
f f  

= 
Z
, jZ . 
Multiplying both sides by *( )jf   and summing over j  we obtain: 
* 3 * * * 2( ) ( ) ( )j j j k
j j k
f f f   
  
=  
Z Z Z
. 
Suppose *( ) 0jf  =  for all j l  but 
*( ) 0lf   . Then the above equation implies 
* 3 * * 3( ) ( )l l lf f  = , which gives 
* 0l = . Write 
* *exp( )al l lS = . By assumption (B1) since 
* 0l =  
we have *
l = − . For 
* 0l =  by (B.2) we obtain 
*( )jf  =   for some jZ  provided 
assumption (B2) holds. Now, 
* * 2
* *
* 2
( )
( )
1 ( )
l l
l l
l
f
g
f
 
 

+
= =
+
. Although * 0l = , the limit of the right 
hand side expression as * 0l →  (and therefore as 
* 2( )lf  →+ ) is equal to one, a contradiction 
since ( )lg   is continuous. Therefore, we conclude that at the fixed point 
*  we must have 
*( ) 0jf  =  for all jZ  which means that 
*  represents a solution. 
(ii) Uniqueness. 
Suppose { }j  and { }j  are distinct solutions. Therefore they must satisfy: 
0exp( )aj j j jk k
k
S G S  

= + 
Z
 
0exp( )aj j j jk k
k
S G S  

= + 
Z
,                                                   (B.3) 
for all jZ , and they also satisfy the following equality: 
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exp( ) exp( ) 1a aj j j j
j j
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 
= = 
Z Z
.                                (B.4) 
Define 
k k k  = −  so that we have exp( )[exp( 1)]
a
j j j jk k
k
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
− = 
Z
. Let exp( )aj j jS  =  and 
notice that exp( 1)j j −   to obtain jk k j j
k
  

 
Z
. This system can be written in the form 
[ ( )] 0B diag −   . Now choose a vector c  such that 0c   , which is always possible provided 
not all the 
j s are zero (a fact that we have to accept since we have assumed the existence of 
two different solutions). By applying the Farkas’ lemma we obtain that since the above 
system has a solution, the system [ ( )]B diag c−  = , 0   must have no solution. Therefore, 
there exists no nonnegative vector   to satisfy 
jk k j j j
k
c  

=  +
Z
. We set 
j w =  for all j so we 
know that there exists no nonnegative w to satisfy 
j jc w= −  . We will obtain an obvious 
contradiction provided we can show that the inequality 0c    is satisfied. But 
2 0j j j
j j
c c w 
 
 = = −     since the j s are positive. The contradiction shows that the solution 
must be unique. 
Farkas’ lemma: The system Ax c= , 0x   has no solution if and only if the system 0A y  , 
0c y   has a solution. 
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Figure 1: Technical and allocative efficiency in the EU (2005-2010) 
 
Note: Authors’ estimations, median efficiency scores are reported.  
 
 
Figure 2: Technical and allocative efficiency in the EU by time. 
 
Note: Authors’ estimations.  
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Figure 3: Sample distributions of distortions of inputs 
 
 
Note: Authors’ estimations.  
 
Figure 4: Sample distributions of input price distortions over time 
 
 
Note: Authors’ estimations.  
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Table 1: Technical and allocative efficiency scores 
  TEFF AEFF 
Austria 0.8817 0.8933 
Belgium 0.7662 0.8971 
Denmark 0.8710 0.8927 
Finland 0.9192 0.9140 
France 0.8629 0.8900 
Germany 0.8843 0.8926 
Greece 0.8041 0.8775 
Ireland 0.8020 0.8626 
Italy 0.8888 0.8763 
Lux. 0.8006 0.8928 
Netherlands 0.8335 0.8978 
Portugal 0.8460 0.8810 
Spain 0.8374 0.8725 
Sweden 0.8155 0.8978 
UK 0.8204 0.8869 
EU-15 0.8422 0.8883 
Note: Authors’ estimations. Figures are in means over the period 2005-2010. TEFF: 
Technical Efficiency; AEFF: Allocative Efficiency.  
 
Table 2: Technical and allocative efficiency and aggregate labour market regulation   
 TECHNICAL EFF ALLOCATIVE EFF 
constant 0.517***      0.617***      
  (0.0156)        (0.0441)        
LR -0.073*      0.256***      
  (0.04)      (0.0217)        
GDPgr 0.00416    0.0202***    
  (0.0177)        (0.000151)        
INFL -0.0036    -0.03313***     
  (0.0021)       (0.00187)       
lnTA 0.0044*    0.0003***    
  (0.0023)        (0.00011)        
NIM -0.0015***    0.0033***    
  (0.00018)       (0.0012)        
EQ/A 0.0017***  -0.00015***    
  (0.00022)        (0.00001)      
LLP/L 0.0015***    -0.0026***    
 (0.00022)        (0.00019)       
Note: ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. S.E. are in parentheses. 
Standard errors are derived from the sandwich estimator of the covariance matrix of the ML estimator. 
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Table 3: Allocative efficiency and labour market regulation (disaggregated)  
       (1)      (2)     (3) 
constant 0.874*** 0.877*** 0.881*** 
  (0.00415) (0.0315) (0.0182) 
MW-FR -0.0554*** -0.0447***  
  (0.00718) (0.0042)  
DISS-FR -0.0570***  -0.0628*** 
  (0.00414)  (0.0025) 
GDPgr 0.0116*** 0.0116*** 0.0255*** 
  (0.0005) (0.00011) (0.00035) 
INFL -0.032*** -0.0295*** -0.0305*** 
  (0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0044) 
lnTA 0.000337 0.000393*** 0.00142*** 
  (0.0002) (0.000102) (0.00036) 
NIM 0.00281 0.00285*** 0.00151*** 
  (0.0027) (0.000262) (0.00042) 
EQ/A -0.0004*** -0.00025*** -0.00044*** 
  (0.0001) (0.00001) (0.00003) 
LLP/L -0.0025*** -0.00261*** -0.00355*** 
 (0.00022) (0.00022) (0.00027) 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. S.E. are in parentheses. 
Standard errors are derived from the sandwich estimator of the covariance matrix of the ML estimator. 
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Table 4: Technical efficiency and labour market regulation (disaggregated)  
    (1)     (2)   (3)    (4) 
constant 0.661***      0.681***      0.681***      0.6723***      
  (0.0241)        (0.0177)        (0.0177)        (0.0163)        
     
     
HF-FR 0.0215     0.0088       
  (0.218)        (0.117)          
CCB-FR 0.0145     0.061      
  (0.118)         (0.125)         
HR-FR 0.0230      0.0214     
  (0.0491)          (0.337)        
GDPgr 0.00335    0.0032    0.0029 0.0032 
  (0.0227)        (0.0454)        (0.0388)        (0.0215)        
INFL -0.0035    -0.0041    -0.0038    -0.0035    
  (0.0454)       (0.171)       (0.161)       (0.177)       
lnTA 0.00361    0.00291 0.00117 0.00128 
  (0.0447)        (0.220)        (0.181)        (0.100)        
NIM -0.00143   -0.0016    -0.0019    -0.0021    
  (0.0187)       (0.0841)       (0.0723)       (0.0815)       
EQ/A 0.002157***  0.00313    0.0022    0.0025    
  (0.00011)        (0.0185)        (0.0140)        (0.0217)        
LLP/L 0.00154***  0.00150    0.00162    0.00155    
 (0.0008891)        (0.116) (0.202)        (0.335)        
Note: ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. S.E. are in parentheses. Standard errors 
are derived from the sandwich estimator of the covariance matrix of the ML estimator. 
  
